In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Vitoria, Cajetan, and the ConciliaristsKatherine Elliot van LiereFrancisco de Vitoria, professor of theology at the University of Salamanca from 1526 until his death in 1546, is widely recognized as the leader of the sixteenth-century scholastic revival and one of the foremost Catholic political thinkers of his day. His surviving relectiones (the lectures given in Salamanca at the end of each university term) cover a wide range of issues (...) from the morality of cannibalism to the legality of Henry VIII’s divorce. 1 Yet modern scholarly interest in Vitoria and his disciples (collectively known as “the School of Salamanca”) has focused mainly on issues relevant to the moral and legal problems of secular nation-states. Between this century’s two great wars Spanish and American scholars took a renewed interest in Vitoria’s published relectiones, seeing in them early expressions of the doctrine of international law, and arguing that Vitoria deserved some of the credit generally given to Hugo Grotius as the inventor of this concept. 2 Since then Spanish, American, and British scholarship on Vitoria and the School of Salamanca has continued to center mainly on such issues as just war, conquest, and slavery. 3 In the 1980s Anthony Pagden [End Page 597] revisited these questions, interpreting the School of Salamanca’s neo-Scholastic teachings as part of the “ideological armature of what [was arguably] the first early modern nation state.” 4 From a similar methodological perspective, Richard Tuck and Quentin Skinner have described the neo-Thomist revival of natural law as an important influence on the development of modern legal and political concepts like the subjective theory of natural rights and the Lockean contractual theory of political obligation. 5 Most recently, Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance have edited and translated into English a selection of Vitoria’s “political writings,” which will serve as a welcome aid for future research on any of these themes. 6Yet Vitoria’s end-of-term lectures in Salamanca also discussed a number of other themes apart from the political theory of secular states. Among these, the theme of the structure and power of ecclesiastical government has so far received less attention than it deserves. 7 Ecclesiastical power, or “the power of the Church,” was one of only two subjects to which Vitoria devoted two relectiones each (the other being the famous debate about Spanish rights to dominion in America). Vitoria delivered his two lectures on ecclesiastical government, both entitled De potestate ecclesiae, in 1532 and 1533. In 1534 he lectured on the closely related theme of “the power of the pope and the council” (De potestate papae et concilii). 8 Vitoria’s treatment, in these three lectures, of the authority of the Church, the pope, and the general council is worth examining more closely not only for the intrinsic interest of these issues but perhaps even more for the light it sheds on the formation of Vitoria’s thinking about secular political power. All three relectiones preceded the two famous Relectiones de indiis (“On the American Indians”) which Vitoria delivered in [End Page 598] 1538 and 1539. For churchmen like the Dominican Vitoria, ecclesiastical and secular political power were inextricably linked; theories posited in one sphere had implications in the other, and in some cases these implications proved politically or theologically awkward enough to force a thinker back to the drawing board. The political theories about the natural origins of secular political power which Vitoria articulated in the late 1530s in his Relectiones de indiis reflect this painful process. They were not only inspired by Vitoria’s awareness of the plight of the American Indians under Spanish colonial rule; they were also shaped by his protracted struggle with the theological implications of natural law theory, a struggle which can be observed in his lectures of the early 1530s on ecclesiastical power.Observing this intellectual struggle in Vitoria’s writing affords more than just one more illustration of how all political thought is rooted in particular social contexts. For Francisco de Vitoria stood at a particularly significant juncture in the history of political thought. The position he carefully defined in the 1530s was characterized by a strong emphasis on the distinction between... (shrink)

Henry Sidgwick, (1838–1900), philosopher, classicist, lecturer and fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and supporter of women's university education, is well known for his Method of Ethics (1874), a significant and influential book on moral theory. First published in 1883, this work considers the role the state plays (and ought to play) in economic life, and whether economics should be considered an Art or a Science. Sidgwick applies his utilitarian views to economics, defending John Stuart Mill's 1848 treatise of the (...) same name. The book calls for a return to traditional political economy by eliminating 'needless polemics'. Sidgwick also outlines the need to bridge the gap between his analytical or deductive method and the inductive method employed by Mill's critics, the new generation of economic philosophers including John Elliot Cairnes and William Stanley Jevons. The second edition, reissued here, was published in 1887. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Vitoria, Cajetan, and the ConciliaristsKatherine Elliot van LiereFrancisco de Vitoria, professor of theology at the University of Salamanca from 1526 until his death in 1546, is widely recognized as the leader of the sixteenth-century scholastic revival and one of the foremost Catholic political thinkers of his day. His surviving relectiones (the lectures given in Salamanca at the end of each university term) cover a wide range of issues (...) from the morality of cannibalism to the legality of Henry VIII’s divorce. 1 Yet modern scholarly interest in Vitoria and his disciples (collectively known as “the School of Salamanca”) has focused mainly on issues relevant to the moral and legal problems of secular nation-states. Between this century’s two great wars Spanish and American scholars took a renewed interest in Vitoria’s published relectiones, seeing in them early expressions of the doctrine of international law, and arguing that Vitoria deserved some of the credit generally given to Hugo Grotius as the inventor of this concept. 2 Since then Spanish, American, and British scholarship on Vitoria and the School of Salamanca has continued to center mainly on such issues as just war, conquest, and slavery. 3 In the 1980s Anthony Pagden [End Page 597] revisited these questions, interpreting the School of Salamanca’s neo-Scholastic teachings as part of the “ideological armature of what [was arguably] the first early modern nation state.” 4 From a similar methodological perspective, Richard Tuck and Quentin Skinner have described the neo-Thomist revival of natural law as an important influence on the development of modern legal and political concepts like the subjective theory of natural rights and the Lockean contractual theory of political obligation. 5 Most recently, Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance have edited and translated into English a selection of Vitoria’s “political writings,” which will serve as a welcome aid for future research on any of these themes. 6Yet Vitoria’s end-of-term lectures in Salamanca also discussed a number of other themes apart from the political theory of secular states. Among these, the theme of the structure and power of ecclesiastical government has so far received less attention than it deserves. 7 Ecclesiastical power, or “the power of the Church,” was one of only two subjects to which Vitoria devoted two relectiones each (the other being the famous debate about Spanish rights to dominion in America). Vitoria delivered his two lectures on ecclesiastical government, both entitled De potestate ecclesiae, in 1532 and 1533. In 1534 he lectured on the closely related theme of “the power of the pope and the council” (De potestate papae et concilii). 8 Vitoria’s treatment, in these three lectures, of the authority of the Church, the pope, and the general council is worth examining more closely not only for the intrinsic interest of these issues but perhaps even more for the light it sheds on the formation of Vitoria’s thinking about secular political power. All three relectiones preceded the two famous Relectiones de indiis (“On the American Indians”) which Vitoria delivered in [End Page 598] 1538 and 1539. For churchmen like the Dominican Vitoria, ecclesiastical and secular political power were inextricably linked; theories posited in one sphere had implications in the other, and in some cases these implications proved politically or theologically awkward enough to force a thinker back to the drawing board. The political theories about the natural origins of secular political power which Vitoria articulated in the late 1530s in his Relectiones de indiis reflect this painful process. They were not only inspired by Vitoria’s awareness of the plight of the American Indians under Spanish colonial rule; they were also shaped by his protracted struggle with the theological implications of natural law theory, a struggle which can be observed in his lectures of the early 1530s on ecclesiastical power.Observing this intellectual struggle in Vitoria’s writing affords more than just one more illustration of how all political thought is rooted in particular social contexts. For Francisco de Vitoria stood at a particularly significant juncture in the history of political thought. The position he carefully defined in the 1530s was characterized by a strong emphasis on the distinction between... (shrink)

Henry Sidgwick,, philosopher, classicist, lecturer and fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and supporter of women's university education, is well known for his Method of Ethics, a significant and influential book on moral theory. First published in 1883, this work considers the role the state plays in economic life, and whether economics should be considered an Art or a Science. Sidgwick applies his utilitarian views to economics, defending John Stuart Mill's 1848 treatise of the same name. The book calls for (...) a return to traditional political economy by eliminating 'needless polemics'. Sidgwick also outlines the need to bridge the gap between his analytical or deductive method and the inductive method employed by Mill's critics, the new generation of economic philosophers including John Elliot Cairnes and William Stanley Jevons. The second edition, reissued here, was published in 1887. (shrink)

"L'oeuvre d'art est une tentative vers l'unique, elle s'affirme comme un tout, comme un absolu et, en même temps, elle appartient à un système de relations complexes [...]. Elle est matière et elle est esprit, elle est forme et elle est contenu [...]. Elle est créatrice de l'homme, créatrice du monde et elle installe dans l'histoire un ordre qui ne se réduit à rien d'autre." Un Eloge de la main complète ce texte. "La main arrache le toucher à sa passivité (...) réceptive, elle l'organise pour l'expérience et pour l'action [...]. Elle se mesure avec la matière qu'elle métamorphose, avec la forme qu'elle transfigure. Educatrice de l'homme, elle le multiplie dans l'espace et dans le temps." [Source : 4e de couv.]. (shrink)

Children are not simply molded by the environment; through constant inference and interpretation, they actively shape their own social world. This book is about that process. Elliot Turiel's work focuses on the development of moral judgment in children and adolescents and, more generally, on their evolving understanding of the conventions of social systems. His research suggests that social judgements are ordered, systematic, subtly discriminative, and related to behavior. His theory of the ways in which children generate social knowledge through (...) their social experiences will be of interest to a wide range of researchers and students in child development and education. (shrink)

Clear and distinct perception is the centrepiece of Descartes’s philosophy — it is the source of all certainty — but what does he mean by ‘clear’ and ‘distinct’? According to the prevailing approach, what it means for a perception to be clear is that its content has a certain objective property, like truth. I argue instead that clarity is at least partly a subjective, phenomenal quality whereby a content is presented as true to the perceiving subject. Clarity comes in degrees. (...) Any weak degree of clarity, available to the senses, can be merely subjective, since what it presents as true may not actually be true. But complete clarity, available to intellectual perception, has an objective dimension, since what it presents as true is always some truth, some bit of reality. Further, I argue that the other perceptual qualities that Descartes identifies — obscurity, confusion, and distinctness — are all defined in terms of clarity. Of particular note is the fact that distinctness is not a positive feature to be added to clarity: a distinct perception is just a completely clear perception. (shrink)

In Matters of Life and Death Elliot Dorff thoroughly addresses this unavoidable confluence of medical technology and Jewish law and ethics.

Elliot R. Wolfson intervenes in the debate over Martin Heidegger and Nazism from a unique perspective, as a scholar of Jewish mysticism and philosophy who has been profoundly influenced by Heidegger's work. He reveals crucial aspects of Heidegger's thinking that betray an affinity with dimensions of Jewish thought.

Metaethical expressivism faces the perennial objection that its commitment to non‐cognitivism about moral judgment renders the view revisionary of our ordinary moral thought. The standard response to this objection is to say that since the expressivist's theoretical commitments about the nature of moral judgment are independent of normative ethics, the view cannot be revisionary of normative ethics. This essay seeks to evaluate the standard response by exploring several senses of independence that expressivism might enjoy from normative ethics. I develop a (...) taxonomy on which, at least by the expressivist's own lights, normative ethics is not dependent on non‐cognitivism about moral judgment in a way that might render that claim itself normative ethical. The argument will require us to formulate a theory of moral subject matter according to the expressivist, a matter of independent interest. Although this discussion will essentially vindicate the standard response to the perennial objection, it will also highlight a major limitation thereof. This is that even for the expressivist, the taxonomic independence of non‐cognitivism about moral judgment from normative ethics does not guarantee its moral independence from normative ethics; that is, showing that non‐cognitivism about moral judgment is not a moral claim is not itself to show that it is not a morally relevant claim. I conclude by arguing that the question of moral dependence, usually discussed under the heading of objectivity, is ultimately first‐order moral rather than taxonomic, and so can only be resolved on first‐order moral grounds. (shrink)

Three kinds of things may be creative: persons, processes, and products. The standard definition of creativity, used nearly by consensus in psychological research, focuses specifically on products and says that a product is creative if and only if it is new and valuable. We argue that at least one further condition is necessary for a product to be creative: it must have been produced by the right kind of process. We argue furthermore that this point has an interesting epistemological implication: (...) when you judge a product to be creative--attributing creativity--you are not just judging it to be new and valuable. Even if you did not witness how it was produced, you are also making a judgement about how it was produced. (shrink)

This entry provides a substantive overview of research and debates concerning creativity in philosophy and related fields. Topics covered include definitions of creativity, whether creativity can be learned, whether it can be explained, attempts to explain creativity in cognitive science, and whether computer programs or AI systems can be creative.

Descartes is widely portrayed as the arch proponent of “the epistemological transparency of thought” (or simply, “Transparency”). The most promising version of this view—Transparency-through-Introspection—says that introspecting (i.e., inwardly attending to) a thought guarantees certain knowledge of that thought. But Descartes rejects this view and provides numerous counterexamples to it. I argue that, instead, Descartes’s theory of self-knowledge is just an application of his general theory of knowledge. According to his general theory, certain knowledge is acquired only through clear and distinct (...) intellection. Thus, in his view, certain knowledge of one’s thoughts is acquired only through clear and distinct intellection of one’s thoughts. Introspection is a form of intellection and it can be clear and distinct. Ordinarily, however, introspection isn’t clear and distinct but is instead confused with dubitable perceptions of bodies. To make introspection clear and distinct, we need to “sharply separate” it from all perceptions of bodies by doubting all perceptions of bodies. Without such radical doubt, introspection remains confused and we lack certain knowledge not just of the specific features of our thoughts, but even of the minimal claim that a thought exists. Far from being the high priest of Transparency, Descartes is radically opposed to it. (shrink)

A debate persists over how to distinguish manic states from non-manic ones (such as depressions). A lacuna exists amongst these efforts, where a specifically agentive account of mania would sit. An agentive account centers the manic person’s view of practical reasons, rationalizing their actions in the same way that sympathetic understandings rationalize the actions of more neurotypical agents. In this paper, I argue that mania restructures our agency by creating a pervasive sense of urgency. This urgency changes the kind of (...) handling that our practical reasons seem to call out for. Whilst this can make us less reliable as agents, I argue that this does not undermine the basic capacities on which personal autonomy is founded. The greater threat to manic agents’ autonomy is nonrecognition of this restructured agency, undermining autonomy in its social dimensions. Without an agentive account, we will fail to recognize distinctly manic agency when we see it, limiting our understanding of autonomy, and withholding recognition, fundamental to autonomy in its social dimensions, from manic agents. (shrink)

Some considerations are urgent and others are not. Sometimes, we invite criticism if we neglect the urgency of our situation, even if our action seem adequate to respond to it. Despite this significance, the literature does not offer a satisfactory analysis of the normative structure of urgency. I examine three views of urgency, drawn from philosophical and adjacent literature, which fail to explain the distinctive criticism we face when we do neglect the urgency of our reasons. Instead, I argue that (...) urgent considerations pre-empt our deliberation about less urgent considerations. Urgency is then a metanormative phenomenon, setting standards for how we handle and respond to first-order considerations, requiring that we close deliberation. In the face of urgency, appropriate action is not enough. Commitment is called for. This is how we enact appreciation of our practical reasons, independently of our carrying out the action they call for. (shrink)

This paper explicates Descartes’ theory of intuition (intuitus). Departing from certain commentators, I argue that intuition, for Descartes, is a form of clear and distinct intellectual perception. Because it is clear and distinct, it is indubitable, infallible, and provides a grade of certain knowledge he calls ‘cognitio’. I pay special attention to why he treats intuition as a form of perception, and what he means when he says it is ‘clear and distinct’. Finally, I situate his view in relation to (...) those of his Scholastic predecessors on one hand and current theories on the other. His view anticipates the contemporary ‘perceptual model of intuition’, though it is much bolder with its promise of certainty. (shrink)

Creativity pervades human life. It is the mark of individuality, the vehicle of self-expression, and the engine of progress in every human endeavor. It also raises a wealth of neglected and yet evocative philosophical questions: What is the role of consciousness in the creative process? How does the audience for a work for art influence its creation? How can creativity emerge through childhood pretending? Do great works of literature give us insight into human nature? Can a computer program really be (...) creative? How do we define creativity in the first place? Is it a virtue? What is the difference between creativity in science and art? Can creativity be taught? The new essays that comprise The Philosophy of Creativity take up these and other key questions and, in doing so, illustrate the value of interdisciplinary exchange. Written by leading philosophers and psychologists involved in studying creativity, the essays integrate philosophical insights with empirical research. CONTENTS I. Introduction Introducing The Philosophy of Creativity Elliot Samuel Paul and Scott Barry Kaufman II. The Concept of Creativity 1. An Experiential Account of Creativity Bence Nanay III. Aesthetics & Philosophy of Art 2. Creativity and Insight Gregory Currie 3. The Creative Audience: Some Ways in which Readers, Viewers and/or Listeners Use their Imaginations to Engage Fictional Artworks Noël Carroll 4. The Products of Musical Creativity Christopher Peacocke IV. Ethics & Value Theory 5. Performing Oneself Owen Flanagan 6. Creativity as a Virtue of Character Matthew Kieran V. Philosophy of Mind & Cognitive Science 7. Creativity and Not So Dumb Luck Simon Blackburn 8. The Role of Imagination in Creativity Dustin Stokes 9. Creativity, Consciousness, and Free Will: Evidence from Psychology Experiments Roy F. Baumeister, Brandon J. Schmeichel, and C. Nathan DeWall 10. The Origins of Creativity Elizabeth Picciuto and Peter Carruthers 11. Creativity and Artificial Intelligence: a Contradiction in Terms? Margaret Boden VI. Philosophy of Science 12. Hierarchies of Creative Domains: Disciplinary Constraints on Blind-Variation and Selective-Retention Dean Keith Simonton VII. Philosophy of Education (& Education of Philosophy) 13. Educating for Creativity Berys Gaut 14. Philosophical Heuristics Alan Hájek. (shrink)

There is a strong presumption that mental disorder injures a person's autonomy, understood as a set of capacities and as an ideal condition of agency which is worth striving for. However, recent multidimensional approaches to autonomy have revealed a greater diversity in ways of being autonomous than has previously been appreciated. This presumption, then, risks wrongly dismissing variant, neuro-atypical sorts of autonomy as non-autonomy. This is both an epistemic error, which impairs our understanding of autonomy as a phenomenon, and a (...) moral error, which withholds recognition and respect that autonomous agents are due. I argue that careful attention to the different 'shapes' of agent's autonomy reveals that there are indeed distinctive kinds of neuro-atypical autonomy that are widely mistaken for non-autonomy. This project argues for two propositions. First, that there is a kind of autonomy, with a distinctive shape and texture, available to bipolar agents. This is a variant sort of autonomy, but not a defective or deficient sort. It is the ideal of autonomy that it is worth bipolar agents striving for, given the range and intensity of experiences that they will have to confront. Whilst bipolar autonomy will look unlike more neurotypical kinds of autonomy, it continues to be owed recognition. The second proposition is that we should understand the ideal of autonomy to be both pluralist and highly context sensitive. Given the range of starting points from which agents will strive to an ideal of autonomy, there will be some variation in the ideals worth striving for. The variation in ideals will reflect the existential realities they are local to. Theory of autonomy must be adapted to recognise bipolar, and other neuro-atypical, kinds of autonomy, and to reflect this wider pluralism. These propositions will be argued for with careful attention to the experiences and agency of people living with bipolar, or related, disorders. Understanding the ways that manic or depressive episodes, and the shifts between them, alter and apply pressure to our agency will inform an account of the distinctively bipolar autonomy that can be built on top of it. (shrink)

This paper explicates Descartes’ theory of intuition (intuitus). Departing from certain commentators, I argue that intuition, for Descartes, is a form of clear and distinct intellectual perception. Because it is clear and distinct, it is indubitable, infallible, and provides a grade of certain knowledge he calls ‘cognitio’. I pay special attention to why he treats intuition as a form of perception, and what he means when he says it is ‘clear and distinct’. Finally, I situate his view in relation to (...) those of his Scholastic predecessors on one hand and current theories on the other. His view anticipates the contemporary ‘perceptual model of intuition’, though it is much bolder with its promise of certainty. (shrink)

For the past two decades, it has widely been assumed by linguists that there is a single computational operation, Merge, which is unique to language, distinguishing it from other cognitive domains. The intention of this paper is to progress the discussion of language evolution in two ways: (i) survey what the ethological record reveals about the uniqueness of the human computational system, and (ii) explore how syntactic theories account for what ethology may determine to be human-specific. It is shown that (...) the operation Label, not Merge, constitutes the evolutionary novelty which distinguishes human language from non-human computational systems; a proposal lending weight to a Weak Continuity Hypothesis and leading to the formation of what is termed Computational Ethology. Some directions for future ethological research are suggested. (shrink)

New to English law? Need to know how rules are made, interpreted and applied? This popular and well-established textbook will show you how. It simplifies legal method by combining examples with an account of rules in general: the who, what, why and how of interpretation. Starting with standpoint and context, it identifies factors that give rise to doubts about the interpretation of a rule and recommends a systematic approach to analysing those factors. Questions and exercises integrated in the text and (...) on the accompanying website will help you to develop skills in reading, interpreting and arguing about legal and other rules. The text is fully updated on developments in the legislative process and the judicial interpretation of statutes and precedent. It includes a new chapter on 'The European Dimension' reflecting the changes brought about by the Human Rights Act 1998. (shrink)

In this concluding piece, we identify and discuss various aspects of convergence and, to a lesser degree, divergence in the ideas expressed in the contributions to this special section. These contributions emphatically illustrate that approach–avoidance motivation is integral to the scientific study of emotion. It is our hope that the articles herein will facilitate cross-talk among researchers and research traditions, and will lead to a more thorough understanding of the role of approach–avoidance motivation in emotion.

"With its signal distinction between 'intuition' and 'analysis' and its exploration of the different levels of Duration, _An Introduction to Metaphysics_ has had a significant impact on subsequent twentieth century thought. The arts, from post-impressionist painting to the stream of consciousness novel, and philosophies as diverse as pragmatism, process philosophy, and existentialism bear its imprint. Consigned for a while to the margins of philosophy, Bergson’s thought is making its way back to the mainstream. The reissue of this important work comes (...) at an opportune time, and will be welcomed by teachers and scholars alike." --Peter A. Y. Gunter, University of North Texas. (shrink)

Natural language syntax yields an unbounded array of hierarchically structured expressions. We claim that these are used in the service of active inference in accord with the free-energy principle (FEP). While conceptual advances alongside modelling and simulation work have attempted to connect speech segmentation and linguistic communication with the FEP, we extend this program to the underlying computations responsible for generating syntactic objects. We argue that recently proposed principles of economy in language design—such as “minimal search” criteria from theoretical syntax—adhere (...) to the FEP. This affords a greater degree of explanatory power to the FEP—with respect to higher language functions—and offers linguistics a grounding in first principles with respect to computability. While we mostly focus on building new principled conceptual relations between syntax and the FEP, we also show through a sample of preliminary examples how both tree-geometric depth and a Kolmogorov complexity estimate (recruiting a Lempel–Ziv compression algorithm) can be used to accurately predict legal operations on syntactic workspaces, directly in line with formulations of variational free energy minimization. This is used to motivate a general principle of language design that we term Turing–Chomsky Compression (TCC). We use TCC to align concerns of linguists with the normative account of self-organization furnished by the FEP, by marshalling evidence from theoretical linguistics and psycholinguistics to ground core principles of efficient syntactic computation within active inference. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 10, October 2022.

How can we use our knowledge of how the mind works to help people act in ways that can prevent disaster, prepare for it, or at the very least, help them respond to a disaster in ways that will reduce its impact? This paper suggests that the most effective method for helping the public deal with disaster, and preventing denial, is to provide them with a concrete, doable, and effective strategy. A number of examples are discussed, including government warnings about (...) increased threat levels, the handling of the 9/11 cleanup by the EPA, the disaster relief problems during Hurricane Katrina and several social psychology experiments which used a "hypocrisy paradigm" to address condom use and water conservation among college students. The paper suggests that the best policy approach for dealing with disaster is one which not only convinces people to prepare for disasters by changing their behaviors through puncturing their rationalizations but also one where communication which produces high fear can lead to sensible action. (shrink)

Abstract:Bipolar or related disorders (BoRD) present unique practical and existential problems for people who live with them. All agents experience changes in the things they care about over time. However people living with BoRD face drastic shifts in what seems valuable to them, which upset their longitudinal values (if, indeed, any stable longitudinal values are available in the first place). Navigating these evaluative high seas presents agents living with BoRD with a distinctive existential question, not shared by those on calmer (...) waters. I draw out two contrasting ways in which someone living with BoRD might seek to support their self-determination in these circumstances, by crafting appropriate self care and support regimes. The first strategy involves managing one’s affective episodes so that they do not interrupt one’s plans and long-term agency over time. The second involves a regimen that allows one the greatest degree of freedom in adapting to changes in one’s experiences of value. What distinguishes these sorts of self-determination is the scope at which they are predicated. Although both sorts of self-determination allow an individual to rule themselves, they alter the overall shape of one’s autonomy in quite different ways. (shrink)

In In V Metaphysics, lec. 9, Aquinas distinguishes between “being by accident” (ens per accidens) and “being by itself” (ens per se) and includes the nine accidental categories under the latter. But isn’t substance a being per se while accidents are, by definition, accidental beings? Several authors—including Ralph McInerny, Paul Symington, and Greg Doolan—have offered explanations of this strange classification. Drawing on an overlooked parallel text in the Posterior Analytics commentary and on Aquinas’s critique of Avicenna’s understanding of accidental denominatives, (...) this paper presents an alternative explanation of the lecture. In the process, it clarifies how Aquinas views the relation of the ten categories to predication and suggests important implications for how we should understand the analogy of being and the phrase “substantial being” (esse substantiale). (shrink)

William Godfrey-Smith is now William Grey. It is agreed that the moral community can be justifiably extended to include sentient non-humans, however, it is claimed that it is possible to give up human chauvinism without adopting the ethic Godfrey-Smith advocates. Feinberg's interest principle is taken by Godfrey-Smith to be the most promising for demarcating the class of individuals to whom rights can be properly attributed. It is claimed that this principle does not force an extension of the class of rights-holders (...) beyond the class of sentient individuals, as claimed by Godfrey-Smith, to include individual trees, rainforests, soils and whole species. The crucial difference, it is claimed, is that sentient individuals but not plants are the subjects of experience. It is claimed that Godfrey-Smith has not provided sufficient argument to force an extension of the class of right-bearers in the way he advocates. Godfrey-Smith opposes the view that all values are grounded in human interest and concern, however, it is not necessary to accept his conclusion in order to argue against this position. Finally, it is not clear that he has produced an argument that shows there is no dependence between value and valuers analogous to the dependence between, say, lies and liars. (shrink)